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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action to determine the balance due 
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court determined the balance due on the 
Case No. 
13670 
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contract to be the sum of $2,439.26 and ordered the seller 
to convey title to the buyer upon payment of said sum. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court affirmed. In addition, respondent has filed 
a cross-appeal and seeks to be awarded reasonable attor-
ney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although there are several parties named in the 
caption herein, the only parties to the present litigation 
are Ann Larsen Brown, who was the seller, and Russell 
G. Fullmer, who was the purchaser of a home under a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. The appellant herein is 
the seller, and the respondent, the buyer. The purchase 
price under the Uniform Real Estate Contract was $11,-
000.00 and the contract called for monthly installment 
payments of $100.00 per month. 
The property sold under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was partially destroyed by fire and a dispute 
arose between the buyer and the seller as to the applica-
tion of the proceeds from a fire insurance policy. The 
seller took the untenable position that she was entitled 
to all of the insurance proceeds and that the buyer was 
to be given no credit on the contract balance. The matter 
came to trial on October 27, 1972, and the court ruled 
against the seller, holding that the $8,000.00 (which was 
the amount of insurance proceeds on the real property) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be applied on the contract balance (R-39). The court 
in its Findings and Decree of November 29, 1972, also 
determined the contract balance, after applying the 
$8,000.00 credit, to be the sum of $3,040.26 plus interest 
at seven and one-half percent (7%%) per annum from 
March 1, 1972. No appeal was taken from that decree, 
and the appellant acknowledges at page 7 of her brief 
that the judgment was res judicata. 
After the decree of November 29, 1972, the buyer 
was unable to continue making monthly payments but 
paid $1,000.00 on December 1, 1973, and tendered the 
full balance due, including interest, of $2,439.26 on De-
cember 31, 197J. The seller refused to acknowledge the 
decree of the court and claimed there were additional 
amounts due and owing under the contract. Buyer there-
upon filed a motion to compel the seller to convey title. 
It was stipulated that the motion be heard and determined 
before the same judge who had tried the case (T-109). 
After a hearing on the motion at which time additional 
evidence was presented, the court concluded in its decree 
of March 20, 1974, that the buyer had correctly computed 
the balance due in accordance with the prior decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY COM-
PUTED THE CONTRACT BALANCE AND 
DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING THE SELLER 
TO CONVEY TITLE. 
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The sole question before the trial court was to de-
termine the balance due under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. This involved the equivalent of a third-grade 
arithmetic problem. The contract balance had already 
been judicially determined to be $3,040.26 plus interest 
at seven and one-half percent (7%%) from March 1, 
1972. A payment of $1,000.00 was made on December 1, 
1973, and the only task for the trial court was to make 
a few simple mathematical computations to determine 
the balance due on December 31, 1973. This was cor-
rectly computed to be $2,439.26. 
Seller apparently places some significance on a No-
tice to Quit which her attorney prepared in March of 
1973 (Exhibit 2-D) because of the buyer's failure to make 
some monthly contract payments. The Notice to Quit 
had absolutely no legal effect for several reasons. First, 
it was never served upon the buyer but upon his mother 
at an address where he had not resided for many years 
(Exhibit 1-D). Second, it was an unlawful attempt to 
forfeit the buyer's interest in that the buyer had already 
paid off approximately three-fourths (%) of the contract 
balance and any such forfeiture would be unconscionable 
and not permitted under Utah law (See Andreason vs. 
Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P. 2d 404; Perkins vs. Spencer, 
121 Utah 486, 243 P. 2d 446). Third, the forfeiture pro-
visions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract are not self-
executory (See Fuhriman vs. Bissegger, 13 Utah 2d 379, 
375 P. 2d 27) and the notices as required under the con-
tract to terminate the buyer's interest were never given. 
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When the Notice to Quit was served upon the buyer's 
mother, counsel for the buyer called the seller's attention 
to all of the above facts and further pointed out in his 
letter to Mr. Hansen of March 28, 1973, (Exhibit 1-D) 
that he had not discussed the matter with his client but 
did not believe the buyer was delinquent anyway, and 
that the contract was paid ahead. Reference was made 
to 55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, Section 340 to 
the effect that if the average payments made are as 
much as stipulated in the contract, the vendor cannot 
terminate if the contract provides for a "certain amount" 
per month (which is the case here) and not a "certain 
amount or more" per month. Subsequent letters to coun-
sel, and particularly the letter of May 31, 1973, (Exhibit 
1-D) emphatically stated the buyer's position by stating 
as follows: 
"The balance due on the contract was de-
termined by court decree and that is the bal-
ance which we acknowledge is due, plus accrued 
interest on the unpaid balance." 
The above language seems clear enough, and it is diffi-
cult to see how any kind of an estoppel can be claimed. 
In any event, it later became totally irrelevant as to 
whether the buyer was or was not in default on the date 
of the Notice to Quit. A $1,000.00 payment was made 
and accepted on December 1, 1973, and then the full bal-
ance was tendered on December 31, 1973. Even if there 
had been a delinquency at that time, the buyer would 
have had the right to pay off the contract, as under 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah law a seller cannot accelerate and foreclose if a 
tender of back payments is made. Romero vs. Schmidt, 
15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P. 2d 37. 
The seller has referred to a schedule at page 19 of 
the record in which she shows how she has attempted 
to compute the contract balance. Under seller's theory 
of the case, she is attempting to charge interest at the 
contract rate on not only the unpaid balance, but upon 
the $8,000.00 which was paid on March 1, 1972 and cred-
ited against the contract balance by judicial decree on 
November 29, 1972. Seller has had the full benefit of 
the $8,000.00 payment since March 1, 1972. It isn't 
reasonable to permit her to collect interest on something 
she has been paid. No authority has been cited by ap-
pellant that would justify such a far-out position. The 
contract itself at paragraph 4 calls for a payment of in-
terest "on all unpaid portions of the purchase price" and 
not upon amounts that have been paid. If seller's argu-
ments were followed to their logical conclusion, it would 
mean that the amount of interest on the unpaid balance 
from the date of the decree to the date of payoff would 
be something in the neighborhood of thirty percent 
(30%), which rate at least up until recent years was 
considered usurious and imconscionable and subject to 
the invocation of rather severe penalties. 
In addition to asserting the unconscionable position 
as stated abovce, the seller is further attempting to make 
a different application of the $8,000.00 payment than was 
made in the judgment of the court of November 29, 1972. 
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Under Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
her time for appealing such judgment had long since ex-
pired, and the one month appeal time has always been 
construed by this court as being jurisdictional in nature. 
In re Estate of Ratlijj, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P. 2d 571; 
Sorenson vs. Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P. 2d 439. 
The seller, in this case, really isn't in a position to 
complain about anything. She entered into a contract 
which if paid according to its terms would amortize over 
approximately sixteen (16) years. She has been paid the 
entire contract balance, plus every penny of interest due 
her, in less thaii three (3) years. Her unjustified demands 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE 
RESPONDENT. 
Paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
provides that the "defaulting party shall pay all costs 
and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which 
may arise or accrue from enforcing this Agreement." Re-
spondent tendered the full payment and then was forced 
to incur attorney's fees to compel the appellant to per-
form her contract. Evidence was presented that $300.00 
was a reasonable attorney's fee in connection with the 
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motion to compel conveyance. The reasonableness of 
the amount of the fee was not disputed either in the 
lower court or on appeal. Yet the trial court failed to 
make an award of attorney's fees. 
The case of Swain vs. Salt Lake Real Estate & In-
vestment Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P. 2d 709, in-
volved an award of attorney's fees under a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. It had been stipulated that $250.00 was 
a reasonable fee; a suit for foreclosure had been instituted 
and the buyer prevailed; and the lower court failed to 
make an award of attorney's fees. The court on appeal 
held that it was error not to award attorney's fees to the 
prevailing buyer and modified the judgment to award 
attorney's fees. See also Clegg vs. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 
516 P. 2d 348, holding that under paragraph 21 of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, the prevailing party is 
entitled to attorney's fees while pursuing any remedy 
under the contract. 
In the Swain case, supra, the court held that attor-
ney's fees for the appeal were a matter of discretion with 
the Supreme Court. Respondent in his cross appeal seeks 
not only attorney's fees incurred in the trial court, but 
also reasonable attorney's fees for the appeal. Respon-
dent has been required at great expense to litigate two 
separate issues (the original issue involving the applica-
tion of the fire insurance proceeds as well as the issue 
on the motion to compel conveyance) both of which were 
totally without merit. The appeal herein is likewise with-
out merit. Counsel for the appellant hasn't cited a single 
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authority in support of his position. The appeal has been 
oppressive and expensive, as well as causing a great hard-
ship on respondent in having the title to the property 
clouded during the litigation. If the attorney's fee clause 
in the contract is to be construed in accordance with its 
clear meaning, respondent should be allowed attorney's 
fees for the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, respondent respectfully requests that the 
determination of the trial court as to the contract balance 
be affirmed, but that the decree be modified in accord-
ance with the cross-appeal herein to award attorney's 
fees incurred both in the trial court and on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Cross-
Complainant-Respondent 
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